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Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences* 
MURAT C. MUNGAN† & JONATHAN KLICK‡ 
There is a 250-year-old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement 
literature that people are deterred more by increases in the certainty rather than 
increases in the severity of legal sanctions. We call this presumption the Certainty 
Aversion Presumption (CAP). Simple criminal decision-making models suggest that 
criminals must be risk seeking if they behave consistently with CAP. This implication 
leads to disturbing interpretations, such as criminals being categorically different 
from law-abiding people, who often display risk-averse behavior while making 
financial decisions. Moreover, policy discussions that incorrectly rely on criminals’ 
risk attitudes implied by CAP are ill informed, and may therefore have unintended 
negative consequences. 
In this Article, we first demonstrate, contrary to most of the existing literature, 
that CAP-consistent behavior does not imply risk-seeking behavior. A host of 
considerations that are unrelated to risk attitudes can generate behavior that is 
consistent with CAP, including stigmatization, discounting, judgment proofness, 
the forfeitability of illegal gains, and the possibility of being punished for 
unsuccessful criminal attempts. Next, we discuss empirical methods that can be 
employed to gain a better understanding of criminals’ risk attitudes and 
responsiveness to various punishment schemes. These methods focus on the various 
non-risk-related-considerations that may be responsible for CAP-consistent 
behavior. Finally, we discuss the importance of gaining a better understanding of 
criminals’ attitudes for purposes of designing optimal law enforcement methods, 
punishment schemes for repeat offenders, plea bargaining procedures, and 
standards of proof. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a presumption in the law and economics literature that criminals are more 
deterred by the certainty of punishment than by the severity of punishment,1 leading 
many legal scholars to infer that criminals are risk seeking.2 Scholars of law and 
economics may find this inference disturbing; criminals would thus make decisions 
in an intrinsically different way than noncriminals, who are assumed to be risk 
averse.3 Of more fundamental importance is the fact that legal scholars make 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. CESARE BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Edward 
D. Ingraham trans., 2d Am. ed., Academic Reprints 1953) (1819) (“Crimes are more 
effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.” (emphasis in 
original)); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 36 (5th ed. 2009) 
(citing Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of 
Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 42 JUST. Q. 173 (1987)). 
 2. E.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 207–08 (1968) (implying that criminals are risk seeking because the greater 
deterrent effect of certainty shows that criminals would prefer a risky punishment scheme); 
Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking Criminal Trial Bifurcation, 
61 U. TORONTO L.J. 811, 820 (2011) (arguing for comparative sentencing and observing that 
the argument rests on risk-seeking attitudes); see also Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, 
Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to 
Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 138 (1995) (attempting empirically to 
determine criminal risk attitudes); James Foreman-Peck & Simon C. Moore, Gratuitous 
Violence and the Rational Offender Model, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 160, 161 (2010) (putting 
forth the inference from certainty aversion to risk seeking as one of two paradoxes confronting 
the rational-offender model when considering risk preferences). 
 3. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 106 (1973) (“‘[T]he 
offender may differ from his law-abiding neighbor simply in being prepared to violate the law 
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recommendations and observations that rely on assumptions about criminal risk 
preferences.4 Is this inference that criminals are risk seekers truly justified? In this 
Article, we demonstrate that there are numerous reasons for why this conclusion may 
be wrong, propose empirical methods to better understand criminal risk attitudes, and 
discuss how important the issue is in light of its direct effect on criminal policy. We 
start with a brief introduction of the concepts and presumptions central to our 
analysis. 
Risk aversion, one of the focal concepts in our analysis, refers to a person’s 
reluctance to invest in assets with uncertain payoffs, even if such investment would 
on average benefit that person.5 Conversely, a person who is risk seeking would 
invest in assets with uncertain payoffs even if the expected returns from those assets 
are slightly negative.  
Economic analysis of crime suggests that a 250-year-old presumption might be at 
odds with the generalization that people are usually risk averse.6 Cesare Beccaria 
                                                                                                                 
 
untroubled by the uncertainties which alone deter his neighbor.’” (quoting JOHN COHEN, 
CHANCE, SKILL, AND LUCK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUESSING AND GAMBLING 39 (1960))); 
William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, On Criminals’ Risk Attitudes, 55 ECON. LETTERS 97, 97 
(1997) (observing that if criminals are risk seeking, they would be distinct from law-abiding 
citizens). 
 4. See Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: 
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 276, 298–99 (1999) (assuming that criminals are risk seeking with respect to 
imprisonment and thus justifying uniform sanctions); see also Fisher, supra note 2; Oren 
Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 384 (2012) (stating 
that defendants are generally risk seeking but that innocent defendants may exhibit more 
risk-seeking behavior than guilty defendants (citing Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion 
and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 (1999) (“[T]he most convincing basis for why 
defendants plead guilty despite loss aversion is that defendants are risk seeking in the domain 
of losses . . . .” (emphasis in original)))); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A 
Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 
1552 (1974) (citing William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes 
Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 705–06 (1973) (claiming on 
grounds of risk preferences that raising the severity of fines has more deterrent effect than 
raising enforcement probability in the antitrust setting)). But see Stephanos Bibas, Plea 
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2495 (2004) 
(“Prosecutorial bluffing is likely to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who 
are on average more risk averse than guilty defendants.”). 
 5.  
A decision maker is said to be risk averse if that person starting from a position 
of certainty rejects the addition of any fair gamble to that certain starting position. 
Adding a fair gamble to a nonrandom starting position yields a gamble whose 
mean value is the same as the initial nonrandom starting value. Thus, a certain 
starting position is converted to a random one with the same mean. Risk aversion 
is always avoiding such a change. 
Jack Meyer, The Theory of Risk and Risk Aversion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 99, 106 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014) (italics in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
 6. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93; Becker, supra note 2, at 207–08; Isaac 
Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN THE 
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published Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishment) in 1764, in which he 
claimed that certainty rather than severity of punishment has a greater deterrent 
effect.7 Gary Becker, in his famous article titled Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, published in 1968, first endorsed Beccaria’s presumption and 
then demonstrated that it implies that criminals, contrary to the rest of the population, 
must be risk seeking.8 
Are criminals really different from the rest of the population in their risk attitudes? 
If not, is there something wrong with Beccaria’s presumption or Becker’s analysis? 
Answering these questions requires an analysis of Becker’s theory of crime and 
deterrence, as well as empirical studies investigating Beccaria’s presumption. These 
questions deserve attention, not only because of their academic value in 
understanding criminal decision-making processes, but also because their answers 
are crucial to identifying cost-effective policies to reduce crime. If criminals’ risk 
attitudes can be identified, they can be used to design more effective law enforcement 
methods. 
The primary goal of this Article is to identify potential empirical methods to 
identify criminals’ risk attitudes. To do this, we review previous commentaries as 
well as theoretical and empirical studies that relate to the topic. We show that 
Becker’s analysis and its later interpretations abstract from a number of potentially 
important considerations. We demonstrate that when these considerations are taken 
into account, Beccaria’s presumption does not imply that criminals are risk seeking. 
This observation allows us to form testable hypotheses concerning the relevance of 
various considerations that Beckerian models abstract from and discuss various 
empirical methods that can be employed to test such hypotheses. We begin by 
considering Becker’s seminal piece on the economics of crime and deterrence. 
In 1968, Gary Becker applied modern economic theory to analyze crime and 
criminal decision making.9 After his seminal contribution, a very broad literature on 
the economics of deterrence and law enforcement emerged.10 A crucial assumption 
in the Beckerian approach is that criminals react to incentives and that they can 
potentially be deterred from committing crime.11 In the simplest Beckerian 
framework, deterrence is achieved through the threat of punishment. This threat 
consists of two components: certainty and severity of punishment. These two 
components generate a perceived threat of punishment. If a potential criminal’s 
expected benefit from crime outweighs this perceived threat, then he commits the 
                                                                                                                 
 
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68, 75 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974). 
 7. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93. 
 8. Becker, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. 
SURVS. 267 (1997) (reviewing the law and economics literature on optimal law enforcement); 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 
38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000).  
 11. Most theory articles take this assumption for granted. However, there are exceptions 
in the literature, where some criminals are assumed to be nondeterrable. See, e.g., Thomas J. 
Miceli & Catherine Bucci, A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 1 
REV. L. & ECON. 71 (2005). In these alternative settings, nondeterrable individuals can be 
thought of as gaining extremely high benefits from crime. 
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crime. The aggregate level of deterrence is simply the number of potential criminals 
whose criminal benefits are offset by the perceived threat of punishment. 
After this simple framework was developed, it was used to test many hypotheses. 
In particular, it was used to discuss the validity of Beccaria’s assertion that “[c]rimes 
are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.”12 
This presumption was accepted by influential scholars, as it appears to be intuitive.13 
The presumption continued drawing attention from economists and criminologists. 
Empirical studies, which reported results that support it, were conducted to 
investigate its validity.14 We refer to this presumption as the “Certainty Aversion 
Presumption” (CAP). 
Some interpretations of CAP are somewhat disturbing; within the simple 
Beckerian model of crime and deterrence, criminals must be risk seeking if they 
behave in a manner consistent with CAP.15 “This would make criminals different 
from the rest of the population, because the other types of analysis have established 
that law-abiding citizens tend to be risk averse.”16 Various scholars responded by 
offering alternative explanations of CAP that do not rely on inherent differences 
between criminals and noncriminals. Existing studies that provide such explanations 
include Neilson and Winter (1997), Block and Lind (1975), and Mungan and Klick 
(2014).17 
Neilson and Winter use tools from decision theory18 that are capable of 
conveniently incorporating fixed costs associated with convictions. Such fixed costs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93 (emphasis in original).  
 13. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 178 (“This approach also has an interesting 
interpretation of the presumed greater response to a change in the probability than in the 
punishment. . . . The widespread generalization that offenders are more deterred by the 
probability of conviction than by the punishment when convicted turns out to imply in the 
expected-utility approach that offenders are risk preferrers . . . .”); see also JAMES Q. WILSON 
& RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397–401 (1985) (citing various 
studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s to discuss the deterrent effects of increases in 
the certainty and severity of punishment). The main point made by Wilson and Herrnstein is 
that an increase in the severity, if not accompanied by an increase in the probability of 
punishment, does not have a great deterrent effect. 
 14. See, e.g., Block & Gerety, supra note 2; Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of 
Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297 (1991). 
 15. A proof of this result is provided by many economists, and in different settings. See, 
e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 178; Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 77–78; Neilson & Winter, supra 
note 3, at 98. 
 16. Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97.  
 17. See id.; Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes 
Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479 (1975); Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan 
Klick, Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, Attempts, and Implied Risk Preferences, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 
137 (2014). 
 18. In particular, the authors use state-dependent and rank-dependent expected utilities to 
demonstrate their points. State-dependent utilities are used to capture the idea that a person’s 
enjoyment of wealth (or other things) can be affected by factors that are not directly related to 
his wealth. A convict may enjoy his wealth less, for instance, if the stigma attached to his 
conviction reduces his ability to share and enjoy his wealth with others (who upon his 
conviction have distanced themselves from him). Rank-dependent expected utilities, on the 
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are present when a person is stigmatized for being convicted, or if an ex-convict can 
simply no longer enjoy his wealth as much as he could before conviction. Block and 
Lind develop a model where criminals are risk averse in wealth, but risk seeking in 
sentences, and still obey CAP.19 Block and Lind’s article highlights the fact that risk 
attitudes have different meanings in different contexts, and that criminals need not 
be different from the rest of society simply because they are risk seeking in sentences. 
As demonstrated in their paper, behavior that is consistent with risk seeking in 
sentences can be the product of something that is commonly assumed of 
noncriminals, namely discounting of future sentences.20 
The explanations offered by Neilson and Winter and Block and Lind rely 
mainly on the sanction being nonmonetary. When sanctions are, to the contrary, 
monetary, fixed costs of conviction (stigmatization or loss of the ability to enjoy 
wealth) and discounting of future sentences are not as relevant. We recently 
offered a new and separate explanation as to how CAP and the presumption that 
criminals are risk averse can be reconciled.21 We make the observation that simple 
crime-and-deterrence models ignore the possibilities of forfeiture of illegal gains and 
being caught while attempting a crime. When elimination of illegal gains to the 
criminal through these possibilities is a real concern, 
increasing the probability of detection leads to an increase in the 
expected monetary fine as well as a reduction in expected benefits. In 
contrast, an increase in the sanction increases only the expected monetary 
fine but does not affect the expected benefits of crime. Therefore, it is 
only natural that potential offenders contemplating such crimes are more 
sensitive to increases in the probability of detection rather than an 
increase in monetary fines, even if they are risk-averse expected-utility 
maximizers.22 
Each of the briefly reviewed explanations as to why criminals may appear to be 
risk seeking relies on different aspects of the criminal’s decision-making process. 
Determining which, if any, of these aspects are truly relevant requires an empirical 
analysis capable of generating evidence that can be used to support or refute the 
explanations provided in the literature. Having a better understanding of which 
explanations are relevant is important for enabling a discussion of policy 
                                                                                                                 
 
other hand, are used to formalize the idea that people can attach different weights to increases 
in the probability of an event based on the initial probability of that event. A person may 
heavily discount very low probabilities and may therefore be unresponsive to increases in such 
probabilities. For instance, a person may not be able to tell the difference between 0.000001 
and 0.000002, and therefore may be almost indifferent between catastrophic events that 
happen with these two probabilities, despite the fact that the second probability is twice as 
large as the first one. 
 19. Block & Lind, supra note 17. 
 20. See id. at 481; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and 
Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–7 (1999) 
(demonstrating that discounting implies risk seeking in sentences). 
 21. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17. 
 22. Id. at 141. 
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implications. Once criminals’ preferences are better understood, it will be easier to 
identify cost-effective strategies in deterring crime.23 
In this Article, we identify hypotheses capable of distinguishing between the 
various assumptions identified in the previous literature and propose empirical 
strategies to test these hypotheses. For example, the hypotheses suggest different 
effects of increasing the certainty of punishment across property and violent crimes. 
While many empirical papers on criminal deterrence have noted differential effects 
between property and violent crimes, virtually no one has linked this effect 
heterogeneity to a structural model of criminal decision making. This Article 
provides a starting point for a more complete understanding of the behavioral 
mechanisms through which deterrence works. 
The remaining parts of this Article are structured as follows. Part I reviews the 
development of CAP and how it implies risk-seeking behavior in standard 
crime-and-deterrence models. In this Part, to avoid any ambiguity in the definition 
of CAP and its implications, we also provide a brief review of technical concepts 
related to risk and risk attitudes.  
Part II reviews ideas that have been presented in the existing law and economics 
literature that challenge the proposition that CAP implies risk-seeking behavior. In 
particular, it presents simplified versions of models proposed by Neilson and Winter, 
Block and Lind, and us. We highlight the assumptions that each model relies on, 
provide intuitive interpretations of each, and demonstrate that they are different. In 
particular, Neilson and Winter rely on stigmatization costs and/or a reduction in 
ex-convicts’ ability to enjoy wealth, Block and Lind assume discounting of future 
sentences, and in our previous articles we focus on the forfeitability of illegal gains 
and the discounting of monetary benefits. Distinguishing between these assumptions 
allows us to design empirical methods (discussed in Part III) that can potentially 
reveal which of these three models may reconcile CAP with the belief that even 
criminals are risk averse. This Part also discusses the meaning of risk preferences in 
detail. We emphasize that special attention should be paid to the domain over which 
risk is defined when interpreting risk. As such, we draw a distinction between risks 
over monetary outcomes versus risks over nonmonetary outcomes.  
In Part III we propose empirical methods to test whether (1) criminals discount 
outcomes in the future, (2) stigma is an important concern for potential offenders, 
and (3) criminals are risk seeking over monetary outcomes. Each of these behavioral 
hypotheses suggests effect heterogeneity when it comes to the effects of changing 
criminal policy variables with respect to the type of crime committed as well as 
observable attributes of the criminal himself. 
Part IV discusses the importance of having a better understanding of criminals’ 
risk preferences. In particular, we demonstrate that optimal enforcement strategies 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (demonstrating how more effective 
deterrent sanctions can be designed if we have knowledge on criminals’ responsiveness to 
certainty versus severity of punishment); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal 
Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979) 
(showing how information on criminals’ risk aversion can be used to design sanction schemes 
that achieve greater deterrence); see also infra Part IV and the sources cited therein for other 
contexts in which knowledge about criminals’ risk preferences can be used to design 
punishment schemes and procedures that enhance deterrence. 
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depend crucially on various assumptions concerning criminal behavior. The issues 
that we consider include (1) the optimal probability and punishment for various 
offenses, (2) optimal plea-bargain offers, (3) optimal punishments for repeat 
offenders, and (4) discretion in sentencing. 
I. THE CERTAINTY AVERSION PRESUMPTION 
A. A Short History of CAP 
Cesare Beccaria’s comments concerning the effects of the severity and certainty 
of punishment form the basis for what we term CAP: 
Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity 
of punishment. Hence in a magistrate the necessity of vigilance, and in a 
judge of implacability, which, that it may become an useful virtue, 
should be joined to a mild legislation. The certainty of a small 
punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more 
severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of 
mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil, 
whilst hope, the best gift of Heaven, hath the power of dispelling the 
apprehension of a greater, especially if supported by examples of 
impunity, which weakness or avarice too frequently afford.24 
Modern social scientists have speculated about the potential historical and 
institutional reasons for why thinkers of the classical school in criminology, such as 
Beccaria, Bentham, and Montesquieu, might have subscribed to this view. In 
particular, as Professor van den Haag states: 
Bentham and Beccaria thought that the certainty of punishment (of 
paying) is most important if the punishment (the price) is to deter. This 
stress on certainty is sometimes used to question the comparative 
effectiveness of severity. But Bentham and Beccaria meant to correct a 
contemporary situation: in the eighteenth century penalties were still 
extremely severe, but they were, perhaps for this reason, haphazardly 
applied and therefore uncertain. Uncertainty reduced or even nullified 
the deterrent effect.25 
Whether the “contemporary situation” that allegedly pushed Bentham and 
Beccaria to form CAP has changed is debatable. It appears, however, that CAP has 
continued to be accepted by social scientists. Professor Mendes suggests that in the 
twentieth century, social scientists continued to show interest in CAP and “insisted 
on distinguishing the relative importance of the certainty and severity of 
punishment.”26 This trend continued in the field of economics, as is best exemplified 
by Gary Becker’s seminal article on crime and punishment: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. BECCARIA-BONESANA, supra note 1, at 93 (emphasis in original). 
 25. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 115 (1975). 
 26. Silvia M. Mendes, Certainty, Severity, and Their Relative Deterrent Effects: 
Questioning the Implications of the Role of Risk in Criminal Deterrence Policy, 32 POL’Y 
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[A] common generalization by persons with judicial experience is that a 
change in the probability has a greater effect on the number of offenses 
than a change in the punishment,27 although, as far as I can tell, none of 
the prominent theories shed any light on this relation.28 
Gary Becker’s last sentence reflects the fact that in the late 1960s, the presumption 
was not yet explained through economic theory. Furthermore, to the best of our 
knowledge, by then no empirical studies sought to test its validity. Becker’s seminal 
work published in 1968, which will be reviewed in the end of this Part, focused on 
providing a theoretical rationale as to why certainty, rather than severity, has a greater 
effect in deterring crime. Soon thereafter, empirical studies were conducted to test 
CAP.29 
In 1991, economist Jeffrey Grogger published a paper titled “Certainty vs. 
Severity of Punishment,” which is cited frequently as providing strong evidence 
supporting the validity of CAP.30 Grogger estimated criminals’ responsiveness to 
increases in the severity and certainty of punishment by employing an empirical 
model that used official arrest records from the California Department of Justice.31 
Later, in 1995, Block and Gerety conducted a study by inviting students and 
criminals to participate in laboratory experiments.32 Block and Gerety concluded that 
students responded more to increases in severity; whereas, criminals responded more 
to increases in the certainty of punishment.33  
Reexamining Grogger’s results, however, it appears that they probably do not 
provide strong evidence of CAP. Essentially, Grogger used a sample of California 
criminals and simply ran regressions of the number of times these individuals were 
arrested in 1986.34 To measure the expected probability of punishment, Grogger took 
the number of times the individual was convicted of a crime prior to 1986 and divided 
                                                                                                                 
 
STUD. J. 59, 62 (2004). 
 27. “For example, Lord Shawness [sic] (1965) said, ‘Some judges preoccupy themselves 
with methods of punishment. This is their job. But in preventing crime it is of less significance 
than they like to think. Certainty of detection is far more important than severity of 
punishment.’” Becker, supra note 2, at 176 n.12 (quoting Lord Shawcross, Crime Does Pay 
Because We Do Not Back Up the Police, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 1965, at 44). 
 28. Becker, supra note 2, at 176. 
 29. See e.g., Block & Gerety, supra note 2; Klára Faragó, Orhidea Kiss & János Boros, 
Risk-Taking in Entrepreneurs, Compared to Criminals and Students: The Role of Uncertainty 
and Stakes, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 2231 (2008); Thorsten Pachur, Yaniv Hanoch & Michaela 
Gummerum, Prospects Behind Bars: Analyzing Decisions Under Risk in a Prison Population, 
17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 630 (2010); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence 
Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence (Princeton Univ. Griswold Ctr. for Econ. 
Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 189, 2009), available at https://www.princeton.edu
/ceps/workingpapers/189lee.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ3M-EF5C]. 
 30. Michael Cain, Is Crime Giffen?, 16 J. FIN. CRIME 80, 81 (2009); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, 
Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 62 (1996); Neilson and 
Winter, supra note 3, at 97; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 7 n.18. 
 31. Grogger, supra note 14, at 298.  
 32. Block & Gerety, supra note 2. 
 33. Id. at 138.  
 34. Grogger, supra note 14, at 299. 
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it by the number of times the individual was arrested.35 For the expected severity of 
the punishment, Grogger used the average prison sentence the individual had 
previously served.36 Examining count data models, Grogger found that the severity 
measure generated a small negative coefficient that was not statistically significant.37 
In contrast, he found a negative coefficient for the probability of punishment 
measurement that was both larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the severity 
variable and was statistically significant.38 Based on these results, Grogger 
concludes, “This evidence suggests that increased certainty of punishment provides 
a much more effective deterrent than increased severity and calls into question the 
wisdom of relying on lengthier prison sentences as a means to decrease crime.”39 
Upon reflection, it is clear that both of these metrics are problematic. It is not at 
all clear that individuals simply use their own private experience in determining their 
expectations of the probability and severity of punishment. Furthermore, the Grogger 
study suffers from deeper problems. First, it is simply not possible to conclude that 
one variable has a stronger effect than another based simply on whether one is 
statistically significant while the other is not. All sorts of things can lead to one 
estimate being less precise than another40 (and therefore being less likely to be 
statistically significant) that have little to do with the “true” effect of a variable on an 
outcome. Second, in neither case is there a reasonable claim that the research design 
allows for a credible identification strategy wherein the probability or severity 
measures can be treated as if they were randomly assigned, allowing for confidence 
in the causal inferences being made.41,42 Nonetheless, the Grogger paper is frequently 
cited as evidence of CAP.  
Block and Gerety’s work comes closer to demonstrating CAP and provides some 
direct comparisons between criminal and noncriminal populations. They 
implemented a contract-bidding experiment in which there was the opportunity to 
increase profits through bid rigging (i.e., collusion).43 However, the researchers 
provided a potential punishment for such collusive behavior, manipulating both the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 303 tbl.3.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 304. 
 40. For example, sampling variation may be larger for one variable than for another. 
Additionally, the effects of omitted variable bias may lead one variable to generate a 
statistically significant effect while another does not, even if the insignificant factor is actually 
more important. 
 41. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics 
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-39, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507324 [https://perma.cc/E8BG-JFPY]. 
 42. Even if these problems did not exist, however, valid direct comparisons of the effects 
are not provided, as Grogger never presents elasticity estimates. Thus, his conclusion is based 
on a comparison of the percentage change in the number of arrests for a unit change in the 
likelihood of being convicted (which is a probability), versus a percentage change in the 
number of arrests for a unit change in severity (measured in months). An elasticity calculation 
would examine the changes in the policy variables in their percentage change forms, 
eliminating the difference in the units being used. 
 43. Block & Gerety, supra note 2, at 125–26.  
2016] IDENTIFYING CRIMINALS’ RISK PREFERENCES 801 
 
likelihood that the punishment would be applied and the size of the punishment.44 
They ran the experiment on two groups of people: (1) a presumably noncriminal 
group of college students from the University of Arizona and (2) a group of inmates 
from an Arizona state prison.45 
Block and Gerety found that while the student group was more responsive to 
changes in the severity of the punishment, the prisoner group actually appeared to be 
more likely to engage in collusion as the severity of the punishment increased, 
suggesting that the prisoners were risk loving.46 Interestingly enough, in response to 
hypothetical survey questions, the student and prisoner groups looked much more 
similar, with both exhibiting risk aversion.47 However, the results from the 
experiments, which involved decision making with real financial consequences and 
which are not subject to the omitted-variable bias problems raised in the context of 
the Grogger paper, provide the strongest empirical evidence for CAP among 
criminals.48 
These empirical and experimental results received great attention, because in the 
Beckerian model of crime and deterrence CAP seems to imply that criminals must be 
risk loving. This would separate criminals from the rest of the society, which appears 
to consist mainly of risk avoiders.49 If true, this would mean that criminals are 
different from the rest of the population in an important and identifiable way—one 
that does not have much to do with the actual pleasure that they derive from 
illegitimate activity, namely their risk attitudes.  
B. Risk & Lotteries 
To analyze and identify risk attitudes, economists make use of what they call 
lotteries.50 Consider for instance a lottery that results in an award of $50 with a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Id. at 126.  
 45. Id. at 124.  
 46. Id. at 134–35. 
 47. See id. at 136 tbl.5. 
 48. That said, one may always question the external validity of experiments like these. 
Presumably, none of the prisoners was arrested for antitrust violations. This raises the question 
of whether one can simply extrapolate decision-making tendencies in one criminal context to 
the domain of the more relevant criminal context the individual is likely to be involved in 
when it comes to real life. 
 49. See Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97. 
 50. One may also use utility functions to represent risk attitudes. In particular, let U be a 
potential offender’s utility function and let w be the monetary equivalent of his initial position. 
In the Beckerian framework, this person will commit crime if:  
U(w) < pU(w + b − s) + (1 − p) U (w + b), 
where b is the monetary equivalent of his gain from crime, s is the criminal sanction, and p is 
the probability of being punished. Utility functions capture potential offenders’ risk attitudes 
by allowing a representation of their marginal benefit from an additional unit of income. If a 
person has diminishing marginal returns, then it is said that U is concave and that he is risk 
averse. If, to the contrary, he has increasing marginal returns, then it is said that U is convex, 
or equivalently that the person is risk loving. See Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: 
Using a Law and Economics Approach To Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That 
Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More Than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 66 n.96 
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probability of 0.7 and an award of $100 with a probability of 0.3. If we call this 
lottery L, it can be compactly expressed as L = (0.7, 0.3 ; 50, 100). The expected 
returns from lottery L would be given by (0.7 × 50) + (0.3 × 100) = 65, which can 
compactly be expressed as E[L] = 65.  
Using this notation, certain risk attitudes can be conveniently identified and 
studied. A person is risk averse if he prefers the expected return of the lottery to the 
lottery itself.51 Alternatively, a risk-averse individual is one who prefers the lottery 
with the smallest variance52 among lotteries that have the same expected values. This 
definition of risk aversion conforms to the intuitive meaning conveyed by the term; 
a risk-averse person prefers certain outcomes over uncertain outcomes, hence, 
avoiding risk.  
To exemplify, consider two lotteries: A = (0.5, 0.5 ; 70, 30) and B = (0.5, 0.5 ; 80, 
20). Although both lotteries have the same expected value (i.e., E[A] = E[B] = 50), 
they have different variances.53 B has a greater variance, because the possible awards 
are distributed more extremely than they are distributed in A. Accordingly, a 
risk-averse individual would prefer A. 
A risk-seeking individual, on the other hand, would prefer B over A, and exactly 
for the opposite reason for why risk-averse individuals prefer A over B. One should, 
however, be careful in interpreting the meaning of risk-seeking attitudes. Risk 
seekers are not assumed to derive pleasure from the mere existence of a probable 
loss. The reason that they prefer B over A is that they place more value on the prospect 
of winning an additional $10 in B’s good state of the world (A would pay $70, and B 
would pay $80 in this state of the world, making the difference $10) than they place 
on not winning an additional $10 in B’s bad state of the world (A would pay $30, and 
B would pay $20 in this state of the world). 
It is also worth clarifying the meaning of risk neutrality. A risk-neutral person 
would be equally happy with either lottery (A or B), because a risk-neutral individual 
ranks lotteries only based on their expected values, and A and B have the same 
expected value of $50. 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2006) (providing a simple explanation of utility functions and risk attitudes as relevant to this 
debate).  
 51. This is the Arrow-Pratt definition of risk aversion, which is equivalent to the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of risk aversion under expected utility. The Rothschild-Stiglitz 
definition of risk aversion would require an individual to prefer the lottery with the lower 
variance between two lotteries that share the same expected value. Conversely, a 
risk-preferring individual would choose the lottery with greater variance. See, e.g., Jan 
Werner, Risk and Risk Aversion When States of Nature Matter, 41 ECON. THEORY 231 (2009) 
(explaining the Arrow-Pratt definition, the Rothschild-Stiglitz definition, and other definitions 
of risk aversion). 
 52. “If X is a random variable with expected value E(X), the variance of X is 
     Var (X) = E{[X − E(X)]2} 
 provided that the expectation exists.” JOHN A. RICE, MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND DATA 
ANALYSIS 131 (3d ed. 2007). 
 53. In particular, let V[A] and V[B] denote the variance associated with each lottery. It 
follows that V[A] = [0.5 × (70 − 50)2] + [0.5 × (30 − 50)2] = 400 < V[B] = [0.5 × (80 − 50)2] 
+ [0.5 × (20 − 50)2] = 900. 
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C. CAP Implies Risk-Seeking Behavior in Becker’s Model 
The definition of risk provided in Part I.B is convenient for demonstrating why 
CAP implies that criminals must be risk seeking in Beckerian models. Before we 
proceed, however, it is useful to provide a more precise definition of CAP to 
eliminate ambiguities and to provide a simple notation explaining the Beckerian 
model. 
1. CAP and Percentage Increases 
To demonstrate how CAP implies risk-seeking behavior54 it is useful to give a 
more precise definition of what is meant by certainty having a greater deterrent effect 
than severity. To ensure a meaningful analysis, we must consider increases in 
severity and certainty that have similar magnitudes. In economics and statistics, this 
is done by comparing equal percentage increases.55 For instance, if the certainty of 
punishment is 50%, and if the punishment is monetary and equal to $500, then an 
increase of 10% in certainty and an increase of $100 in the sanction would be equal 
percentage increases (since both are 20% increases). We can now give a more precise 
definition of CAP: the presumption is that a percentage increase in the certainty of 
punishment has a greater deterrent effect than an equal percentage increase in the 
severity of punishment.56 
2. Simple Notation for the Beckerian Model 
In Becker’s model, potential criminals benefit from committing crime, and dislike 
being punished.57 Therefore, they commit crime if their benefit is sufficiently high, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. See generally Becker, supra note 2, at 178 n.19 (providing the first proof that under 
general assumptions of the expected-utility model, CAP implies risk-seeking preferences); 
Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 77 (noting that “[t]he deterrent effect of a 1 per cent increase in the 
marginal or average penalty per offense can be shown to . . . fall short of that of a similar 
increase in the probability of apprehension and punishment if the offender is a . . . risk 
preferrer”); Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 138 n.5 (citing Becker’s proof, then modifying 
the analysis to include forfeiture of illegal gains); Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 98 
(proving that under normal assumptions CAP implies risk-seeking preferences, then 
modifying the analysis to include state-dependent preferences). 
 55. See, e.g., Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 137–38; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 
20, at 2. Mathematically, if U is the utility function, this corresponds to comparing 
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or if the expected punishment associated with that crime is sufficiently low. This idea 
can conveniently be represented by making use of simple algebra. 
Denote with b the monetary equivalent of the benefit a potential offender gets 
from committing a certain crime, and with p and s, respectively, the likelihood and 
severity of punishment associated with that crime. This notation can be used to 
determine under what conditions potential criminals with various risk attitudes find 
it in their best interest to commit crime. We begin with the simplest case, namely risk 
neutrality. 
3. Risk-Neutral Potential Criminals 
Risk neutrality requires a person to base his decision only on his expected net 
benefit. In other words, a risk-neutral person is an expected value maximizer. Using 
the previous notation, expected net benefits are given by b − (p × s). Since b is 
unaffected by the severity and certainty of punishment, the effectiveness of 
punishment schemes in deterring risk-neutral individuals will depend only on the 
expected sanction, which is the product of the probability and severity of the 
sanction, symbolically p × s.  
In the previous example,58 p = 50% and s = $500, and therefore the expected 
sanction is given by p × s = $250. Increasing the probability of conviction from 50% 
to 60% leads to an expected sanction of (60%) × ($500) = $300. Similarly, 
increasing the punishment from $500 to $600 leads to an expected sanction of 
(50%) × ($600) = $300. As this example demonstrates, equal percentage increases 
in severity and certainty have the same effect on the expected punishment (i.e., on 
p × s).59 And since risk-neutral individuals make decisions based only on the size of 
the expected punishment, equal percentage increases in the certainty and severity of 
punishment have equal deterrent effects on risk-neutral potential criminals. 
4. Risk-Averse and Risk-Seeking Potential Criminals 
To demonstrate how risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals differ in their 
behavior, consider the following three lotteries: L = (0.5, 0.5 ; b − $500, b), L1 = (0.6, 
0.4 ; b − $500, b), and L2 = (0.5, 0.5 ; b − $600, b), where b is a criminal’s benefit 
from crime, and the first value in each lottery (in the form of b − $X) is the criminal 
benefit net of punishment costs. It follows that L1 and L2 are obtained by increasing 
by 10% the certainty and severity of punishment in the lottery L, respectively. Hence, 
lotteries L1 and L2 share the same expected values, namely b − $300.60 
As discussed earlier,61 when a risk-averse individual has to make a choice between 
two lotteries with the same expected value, he prefers the one with less variance. 
Conversely, a risk-preferring individual chooses the lottery with greater variance. It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. See supra Part I.C.1 (expounding this example). 
 59. See sources cited supra note 54. 
 60. This can easily be demonstrated by calculating the respective expected values: 
E[L1] = (0.6 × (b − $500)) + (0.4 × b) = 0.6b − $300 + 0.4b = b − $300 
E[L2] = (0.5 × (b − $600)) + (0.5 × b) = 0.5b − $300 + 0.5b = b − $300. 
 61. See supra Part I.B. 
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is relatively easy to verify that L1 has less variance than L2.62 This follows because 
L1 results in a small penalty often, whereas L2 results in a large penalty less 
frequently. Hence, L2 involves a more extreme distribution of events. Accordingly, a 
risk-averse individual would prefer L1 over L2, and a risk-loving individual would 
prefer L2 over L1. 
What does this imply in terms of the effectiveness of certainty versus severity in 
deterring risk-averse/loving potential criminals? Recall that L1 is obtained by 
increasing the certainty of punishment, and is disliked by risk-loving potential 
criminals. Conversely, L2 is obtained by increasing the severity of punishment, and 
is disliked by risk-averse potential criminals. This observation leads us to the 
Beckerian conclusion: an increase in certainty is more effective in deterring potential 
criminals if and only if they are risk loving.63 
D. Tensions Arising from the Implications of CAP 
CAP was first proposed over 250 years ago. Since then, it has been supported—rather 
than challenged—by modern social scientists, and there is some empirical and 
experimental evidence supporting it.64 This leads us to be reluctant in challenging the 
validity of CAP. A puzzling implication of CAP in Beckerian models, however, is 
that criminals must be risk loving. 
This conclusion is in tension with the implicit belief reflected in many studies that 
even criminals are risk averse to some degree. Furthermore, it is interpreted as 
suggesting that criminals are “different from the rest of the population,” who are 
considered to be risk averse.65 Hence, CAP’s implications are puzzling, if not 
disturbing, and this raises at least two important questions. 
First, should we not rely on results and conclusions derived from economics and 
criminology studies that assume criminals are risk averse (or risk neutral)? Second, 
are criminals really different from the rest of the society on a dimension that has 
nothing to do with their actual illegitimate benefits from crime? 
While the second question is of great academic interest, the first question is 
extremely important for designing policies to deter crime at the lowest cost to society. 
Hence, resolving this puzzle is not only of academic value but is important for 
practical concerns. Therefore, we must first investigate the following question: Can 
risk aversion and CAP coexist in frameworks that incorporate broader approaches 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. To demonstrate this, let V[L1] and V[L2] represent the variances of each lottery. It 
follows that: 
V[L1] = 0.6 × ((b − $500) − (b − $300))2 + 0.4 × (b − (b − $300))2 
= 0.6 × 2002 + 0.4 × 3002 = 24,000 + 36,000 = 60,000 
and 
V[L2] = 0.5 × ((b − $600) − (b − $300))2 + 0.5 × (b − (b − $300))2 
= 0.5 × 3002 + 0.5 × 3002 = 90,000. 
Hence, V[L1] < V[L2]. 
 63. See Becker, supra note 2, at 178 (using expected-utility theory to prove, under his 
assumptions, that certainty is more effective in deterring potential criminals if and only if they 
are risk loving). 
 64. See supra Part I.A (providing a brief review of the historical development of CAP). 
 65. See Neilson & Winter, supra note 3, at 97. 
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than simple Beckerian models? If yes, then it is perhaps the over-simplicity of 
traditional Beckerian models that pushes us to falsely conclude that criminals are risk 
loving. If no, then we must either accept the conclusion that criminals are risk loving, 
or find a fundamental flaw common to all crime-and-deterrence models which 
pushes us to falsely conclude that criminals are risk loving. In Part II, we answer this 
question affirmatively. 
II. RECONCILING CAP WITH RISK AVERSION 
Beckerian models, just like every other economic model, make simplifying 
assumptions. These assumptions may lead to abstractions from considerations that 
may affect conclusions regarding criminals’ implied risk attitudes. Various scholars 
have investigated the implicit assumptions in Becker’s model to determine whether 
they may be responsible for the conclusion that CAP implies risk aversion. In this 
Part, we review three extensions of Becker’s crime-and-deterrence model that may 
reconcile CAP and risk aversion. More specifically, we review three theoretical 
frameworks that demonstrate that CAP can be observed in a world where risk-averse 
criminals make rational criminal decisions.  
A. Domains of Risk: Imprisonment Versus Monetary Prospects  
and Time Preferences 
In Becker’s model, as discussed in Part I.C.2, a potential offender decides to 
commit crime if his illegitimate benefit b is high, and the severity of punishment s 
and/or the certainty of punishment p are low. An implicit assumption here is that b 
and s are measured with the same metric. If the benefit from crime is monetary, and 
if the associated punishment is also monetary, this implicit assumption may not be 
harmful.  
If, however, b is measured in dollars, but s is measured in years in prison, then the 
criminal cannot directly compare these two values. Before he can compare these two 
values, he must convert the expected punishment (which is measured in years in 
prison) to dollars, or convert the monetary benefit from crime into years in prison.  
There are many conceivable ways in which a unit can be converted into another. 
In the case of monetary currencies, for instance, we use conversion rates. One 
converts American dollars to euros by multiplying the number of dollars by the 
exchange rate between dollars and euros. In this case, the conversion is simple; one 
unit is a scalar product of another. 
In other instances, conversion requires a more complicated calculation. Consider, 
for instance, the conversion of future income into its present discounted value.66 In 
this case, future earnings are discounted based on how far in the future they are 
expected to be earned. As such, one cannot simply use a constant exchange rate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. See, e.g., R. CHARLES MOYER, JAMES R. MCGUIGAN, RAMESH RAO & WILLIAM J. 
KRETLOW, CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 158–60 (12th ed. 2012); STEPHEN A. 
ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 130–33 (10th ed. 2013) (explaining the concept of discounting and present values in 
further detail). 
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2 
s 
between future income and current income; the exchange rate depends on another 
variable, namely time. 
So how do criminals convert time in prison for purposes of comparing expected 
punishment with expected illegitimate monetary gains? This is inherently an 
empirical question. However, scholars point out several reasons as to why future time 
in prison, just like future income, would probably be discounted by criminals.67 A 
short list of such reasons:  
i. s usually refers to the “length of the sentence decreed by the court and not 
the length of the sentence that is actually served.”68 This implies that one 
puts less weight on future sentences, because a person’s probability of being 
alive to serve his sentence in the future decreases in time. 
ii. “[S]ince most individuals have a positive time preference for increments of 
wealth they will have a negative time preference for decreases in wealth. 
Since imprisonment usually implies a decrease in wealth, an individual will 
be most concerned with the wealth effects in the early years of a prison 
term.”69 
iii. “[T]he first years of imprisonment may create special disutility due to 
brutalization of the prisoner.”70 
iv. A person might become “accustomed to prison life or … cease[] to care as 
much about those he knew from the outside.”71 
If, as advocated in the existing literature, criminals discount future time spent in 
prison, is it not only natural that they appear to be risk seeking over outcomes that 
involve imprisonment? To answer this question, consider the extreme case where 
future imprisonment is very heavily discounted by a potential criminal. Assume the 
criminal faces two choices, (i) a year in prison with certainty, versus (ii) two years 
in prison with a probability of 50% and no punishment with a probability of 50%. 
Since the second year is heavily discounted, option (ii) is more desirable because it 
involves a 50% chance of punishment that is almost only as bad as the certain 
punishment in (i).72 The two choices in (i) and (ii) share the same expected 
punishment of one year in prison, yet the criminal chooses the one that is more 
uncertain.73 Hence, the criminal appears to be risk loving.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See, e.g., Block & Lind, supra note 17, at 481; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 419 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  
 68. Block & Lind, supra note 17, at 481. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 419 n.27. 
 71. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 3. 
 72. This can be demonstrated through a simple utility function over sentences that 
discount imprisonment in the future. Consider, for example, U(s) = −√		. 
 73. When we use the utility function in the previous note, option (i) results in a net 
disutility of 1, whereas option (ii) results in a net expected disutility of (0.5 × 0) + (0.5 × √			) 
≈ 0.71. Hence, the second option is preferred by the criminal. 
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The important thing to note here is that the criminal appears to be risk loving over 
uncertainties involving time in prison. The economics literature that establishes that 
individuals are, in general, risk averse relies on lotteries over monetary outcomes, 
not over time in prison. There is no reason, a priori, to think that people evaluate 
uncertainties concerning imprisonment the same way that they evaluate uncertainties 
over monetary outcomes.  
In 1975, Michael K. Block and Robert C. Lind, in an article in the Journal of 
Legal Studies, presented a theoretical model that essentially formalizes this idea.74 
Block and Lind point out that people can have different risk attitudes over different 
domains.75 In particular, they can be risk averse over monetary fines, but risk seeking 
over prison sentences, and behave in a manner consistent with CAP.76 As such, CAP 
does not necessarily imply that criminals are different from noncriminals in their risk 
preferences.77 
B. Sentences and Stigma: Implications for Risk Attitudes 
Block and Lind’s argument relies on discounting of future sentences as the 
rationale for criminals’ risk attitudes over sentences. Another reason as to why 
criminals may display risk-seeking behavior over sentences is related to the labeling 
effect that is generated by imprisonment. “A convicted criminal suffers not only from 
public penalties but from stigma, the reluctance of others to interact with him 
economically and socially.”78 
Stigmatization, from a theoretical perspective, produces effects similar to those 
produced by discounting of future jail time on criminals’ implied risk preferences. 
Stigma can be thought of as simply adding what economists call fixed costs to the 
psychic and physical costs of imprisonment. As such, a person would be willing to 
pay a very high price for avoiding conviction, even if the punishment attached to 
such conviction is a single day in prison. Hence, a person can prefer a 50% chance 
of a week in jail and 50% chance of no conviction, to conviction with certainty 
requiring imprisonment for a single day.79 It is easy to verify that such a choice is 
consistent with risk-neutral (and risk-averse) preferences over sentences.80  
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. Block & Lind, supra note 17.  
 75. Id. at 480–81.  
 76. Id. at 480–83.  
 77. Id. at 479 (“Using this framework we are able to explain the relative deterrent effects 
of certainty and severity in punishment without imputing any special behavioral characteristics 
to the class of individuals who commit offences.”).  
 78. Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & 
ECON. 519, 519 (1996). 
 79. To demonstrate this point, let σ denote the stigma attached to conviction. A risk-neutral 
individual’s expected utility from committing crime is therefore EU = b − p(s + σ) when his 
disutility from imprisonment is proportional to his sentence. The expected utility of the first 
option is b − 0.5(7 + σ) = b − 3.5 − 0.5σ, and his expected utility from the second option is b 
− 1 − σ. He prefers the first option if σ > 5, that is, if the stigma associated with conviction is 
greater than the variable cost of going to prison for five days. 
 80. The previous note demonstrates that a risk-neutral individual prefers the first option, 
if σ > 5. This implies that slightly risk-averse individuals prefer the first option, too, when σ > 5. 
See Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 142–43 (proving that if a risk-neutral person strictly 
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The effect of stigmatization on criminals’ risk preferences over imprisonment 
seems, at first glance, indistinguishable from the effect of discounting of future time 
in prison. This is, however, not true. We just demonstrated that a person who fears 
stigmatization may behave in accordance with CAP when he compares a prospect 
that may result in no conviction to another prospect where all outcomes involve 
conviction. But, when all outcomes in all lotteries being compared involve 
conviction, a risk-neutral individual who does not discount future time in prison 
cannot act in accordance with CAP. The reason is simple: all outcomes involve the 
same costs of stigmatization, and since the person values each year in prison equally, 
he is indifferent between two years in prison with certainty and a lottery that results 
in three years in prison with 50% chance and one year in prison with 50% chance.81 
This distinction between the effects of time preferences versus the effects of 
stigmatization can be exploited when designing empirical methods to distinguish 
between the competing (or complementary) theories as to how CAP may be 
reconciled with risk aversion over monetary outcomes.82 
This distinction is particularly important when one considers the incentives of two 
broad groups of offenders: first-time offenders and repeat offenders. There is a priori 
no reason to believe that the members of the two groups have, on average, different 
discount rates for sentences in the distant future. However, members of the first group 
are much more likely to suffer from stigmatization than members of the latter 
group.83 This is because repeat offenders have already been stigmatized after their 
first offense, and therefore the marginal stigmatization effect of the second offense 
is much smaller. This distinction, too, can be exploited in empirical studies to isolate 
the effect of stigma on criminals’ differential responsiveness to the certainty rather 
than the severity of punishment.84 
C. Monetary Sanctions, Forfeiture of Illegal Gains, and Judgment Proofness: 
Implications for Risk Attitudes 
As discussed in Parts II.A and II.B, uncertainties over sentences are 
fundamentally different from uncertainties over monetary outcomes, and there are 
reasons to believe that the revealed risk preferences over sentences do not provide 
much information about criminals’ risk attitudes over monetary outcomes. But what 
if we discover that CAP holds also when we only consider crimes that are punishable 
solely through monetary fines? Are we to conclude that criminals must be risk 
seeking over monetary outcomes? There are at least two reasons to be cautious about 
jumping to this conclusion. 
                                                                                                                 
 
prefers option A to option B, slightly risk-averse people will also prefer A to B). 
 81. To see this, consider the expression for expected utility, supra note 79. The 
person’s expected utility is b − 2 − σ from the first option, which equals his expected utility 
of b − 0.5(1 + σ) − 0.5(3 + σ) = b − 2 − σ from the second option.  
 82. See infra Part III (discussing how empirical methods can distinguish between these 
two effects). 
 83. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, On the Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 715, 719–21 (2004). 
 84. See infra Part III (discussing how empirical studies can isolate the stigmatization 
effect of convictions). 
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Recall that CAP implies that criminals are risk seeking in Beckerian models, and 
that these models make many simplifying assumptions. Two particular assumptions 
are that (i) sanctions are payable by all offenders, and (ii) the size of criminals’ 
benefits does not depend on whether or not they are convicted. In other words, 
people, upon being convicted, are assumed to be capable of paying severe fines and 
also collecting criminal benefits. Not surprisingly, these two simplifying 
assumptions have similar effects on conclusions regarding criminals’ risk attitudes. 
First, a criminal that is judgment-proof85 will be unaffected by an increase in the 
severity of the monetary sanction simply because he does not have sufficient assets 
to pay the monetary sanction in full. As such, if a large proportion of criminals are 
judgment-proof, it would be only natural for increases in monetary sanctions to have 
little deterrent effects. Hence, CAP would hold regardless of criminals’ risk attitudes.  
Second, criminals’ illegitimate benefits can be disgorged upon conviction, which 
may generate additional costs of convictions that are not accounted for via monetary 
sanctions. A similar effect will be observed in cases where preventive law 
enforcement methods are used. In such cases a criminal is prevented from obtaining 
the illegal benefit that he seeks through crime. Therefore, in both cases, 
increasing the probability of detection leads to an increase in the 
expected monetary fine as well as a reduction in expected [criminal] 
benefits. In contrast, an increase in the sanction increases only the 
expected monetary fine but does not affect the expected benefits of 
crime. Therefore, it is only natural that potential offenders 
contemplating such crimes are more sensitive to increases in the 
probability of detection rather than an increase in monetary fines, even 
if they are risk-averse . . . .86 
The second observation, but not the first, is valid in the context of crimes 
punishable by imprisonment as well. It should be noted, however, that by focusing 
on crimes punishable only through monetary sanctions, one can potentially isolate 
the effects of forfeiture of criminals’ illegal gains, because considerations such as 
criminals’ time preferences and stigmatization effects should be irrelevant in the 
context of offenses punishable by monetary sanctions only. 
D. Are Simplifying Assumptions Important? 
The existing literature points out at least three abstractions in simple Beckerian 
models which may be responsible for the (perhaps false) conclusion that CAP implies 
that criminals must be risk seekers. Although these theoretical models are important 
for demonstrating caveats in existing economic arguments, it is impossible to 
determine whether such caveats are important by studying theories. Theoretical 
models simply point out certain possibilities. Whether these possibilities are realities 
is inherently an empirical question. This is why, to determine whether abstractions 
in Beckerian models lead us to false conclusions, we must form testable hypotheses. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See generally S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986). 
 86. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 141. 
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III. WHY DO CRIMINALS APPEAR TO BE RISK LOVING, AND HOW CAN WE KNOW? 
 We have suggested that the conventional wisdom regarding criminals’ risk 
preferences may be incomplete, if not misguided. Specifically, we reviewed alternate 
hypotheses proposed by us and by others that could account for the standard claim 
that criminals are more responsive to increases in the probability of punishment than 
they are to proportionate increases in the severity of punishment without concluding 
that criminals are risk loving. In this Part, we sketch out some empirical strategies 
that could be used to sort these various hypotheses from the hypothesis implied by 
the conventional wisdom (i.e., that criminals are more readily deterred by an increase 
in the certainty or probability of receiving a punishment than they are by a 
proportionate increase in the severity of a punishment). 
Before we commence in laying out some potential ways to test the various 
hypotheses, it is useful to note that the existing empirical evidence is somewhat weak 
relative to the degree to which the conventional wisdom is held among many scholars 
of crime. In the economics literature, as we already suggested, Grogger’s influential 
empirical article on the topic87 actually falls short of providing credible evidence that 
criminals are more responsive to increases in certainty than to increases in severity. 
Block and Gerety88 come closer to providing this evidence; however, skepticism 
could be warranted based on the artificial context that is often a concern about 
experimental designs. Further, even in that article, there is conflicting evidence in 
that their survey results suggest that both criminals and noncriminals alike appear to 
be deterred by increasing the severity of the expected punishment.89 
There are at least two studies that provide evidence against the general idea that 
criminals exhibit CAP to a greater degree than do noncriminals. Avner Bar‐Ilan and 
Bruce Sacerdote examine the effect of increasing the fines for running red lights in 
San Francisco and Israel.90 They find that individuals with criminal records and 
individuals with no prior criminal history exhibit the same elasticity to the increase 
in the fines for the traffic infractions.91 Also, Joanna Shepherd examines the effect 
of the adoption of state sentencing guidelines, finding that reduced sentencing 
discretion under the guidelines is associated with more crime.92 She argues that this 
is consistent with criminals being risk averse as guidelines reduce the variance of the 
expected punishment.93 While the Shepherd paper does not examine the comparison 
of elasticities between responses to changes in severity and certainty, it does at least 
cut against the idea that criminals are risk loving. That said, David Lee and Justin 
McCrary provide evidence that the elasticity of crime with respect to increasing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Grogger, supra note 14. 
 88. Block & Gerety, supra note 2. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, The Response of Criminals and Noncriminals to 
Fines, 47 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2004). 
 91. Id. at 15–16.  
 92. Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial 
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 586 (2007). 
 93. Id. at 587.  
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probability of arrest may exceed the elasticity of crime with respect to sentence 
severity by as much as an order of magnitude.94 
Although we have concerns that crime scholars have been too quick to deduce 
from the empirical record that criminals are more responsive to changes in the 
probability of punishment than to changes in the severity of punishment,95 we are not 
willing to ignore the consensus of such scholars either. With this in mind, we lay out 
some approaches that could be used to better examine any evidence that probability 
elasticities exceed severity elasticities. 
A. Stigma 
The potential role of stigma in generating CAP-consistent behavior could be 
examined by exploiting heterogeneity at the individual level. Namely, the 
mechanisms through which stigma works are primarily a one-shot cost.96 Once one 
is known as a criminal, the stigma attaches, leading to a loss of status, reputation, job 
opportunities,97 and a host of other psychic and economic benefits. Given this, any 
elasticity differential should be substantially smaller for previously convicted 
individuals. 
In individual-level micro data, a researcher could differentially examine the effect 
of changes in the probability of punishment and the severity of punishment on the 
likelihood that an individual commits a crime among those who have no previous 
record and those who do have a record. In aggregate (say, state- or city-level) data, 
one could interact the effects of changes in the probability of punishment and the 
severity of punishment with an indicator capturing the share of the population with 
a criminal record. If stigma is driving any elasticity differential, the interaction effect 
between the severity indicator and the fraction of the population with a criminal 
record should lead to a reduction of the direct differential between the elasticities. 
Another approach might exploit heterogeneity across the stigma associated with 
different crimes. For example, in communities where a drug arrest is taken to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See Lee & McCrary, supra note 29, at tbl.5. 
 95. See Mungan & Klick, supra 17, at 147–48. It seems, at least in some cases, crime 
scholars have been too quick to equate an absence of evidence regarding the effect of 
increasing severity with evidence of an absence of such an effect. Arguably, the research 
designs regarding elements affecting the probability of punishment (such as policing) have 
been much better than the research designs examining the elements of severity (such as prison 
sentences). For more on this point, see Gelbach & Klick, supra note 41. 
 96. See Funk, supra note 83, at 719–21; Murat C. Mungan, Reducing Crime Through 
Expungements 5 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 786, 2016), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711024# [https://perma.cc
/C8WZ-M3VK]. 
 97. See generally Harry J. Holzer, Paul Offner & Elaine Sorensen, Declining Employment 
Among Young Black Less-Educated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 329 (2005) (loss of current employment); John R. Lott, Jr., An 
Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of 
an Individual’s Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992) (loss of reputation); John R. Lott, 
Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583 (1992) (loss 
of future earning power); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 
(2003) (loss of future employment opportunities). 
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indicative of little more than membership in the community, initial differentials in 
elasticities should be smaller than arrests for more stigmatized crimes, and they 
should be smaller than differentials observed in communities where drug crimes are 
more stigmatized. If these effects are not observed, it is less likely that stigma is 
playing much of a role in explaining any CAP-consistent findings. 
B. Forfeiture 
If the possibility of forfeiture is driving any CAP-consistent findings, essentially 
the researcher is failing to adequately measure the punishment, which should include 
the forfeited criminal gains in the calculation of expected loss.98 Put this way, it 
becomes clear that crimes where any gain is immediately enjoyed (and, hence, not 
subject to forfeiture) should not exhibit a differential between the elasticity of crime 
with respect to the likelihood of punishment and the severity of punishment. More 
concretely, if concerns regarding forfeiture are driving the appearance of CAP, there 
should be a larger difference for crimes where any enjoyment of gains is delayed 
(theft, robbery, etc.) than for crimes where any gains are more immediate (assault, 
destruction of property, etc.). Along the same lines, within crime categories such as 
theft, any differential should be larger for thefts where the stolen object will take 
some time to use (e.g., stealing durable goods either to use or resell) as opposed to 
thefts where the object can be consumed quickly (e.g., cash or drugs). 
The extent to which jurisdictions engage in asset forfeiture could also be leveraged 
to test the possibility that forfeiture concerns drive CAP-consistent findings. Crimes 
subject to forfeiture laws and crimes occurring in jurisdictions with more active 
forfeiture practices should exhibit a greater probability-/severity-elasticity 
differential than crimes not subject to asset forfeiture or crimes in jurisdictions where 
asset forfeiture practices are limited. 
C. Discounting 
In our article on the effect of discounting on criminal decision making, we use a 
motivating example where a thief must wait until after his time in jail to enjoy his 
booty.99 In such a context, longer jail sentences have declining marginal effects on 
the criminal’s evaluation of the net benefit of committing a crime.100 For example, if 
part of what deters an individual from committing a crime is the thought of having 
to wait for a number of years to spend the loot, increasing the prison sentence and 
the likelihood of going to prison will both reduce the likelihood of the crime being 
committed. However, while a doubling of the likelihood will have a relatively large 
effect, a doubling of the sentence will have less of an effect.101 This immediately 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Mungan & Klick, supra note 17, at 141–44. 
 99. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Discounting and Criminals’ Implied Risk 
Preferences, 11 REV. L. & ECON. 19 (2015). 
 100. Id.  
 101. To see this, imagine a thief who buries his $100 of loot in the fear that he will soon 
be apprehended. For a jail term of 25 years and an annual discount rate of 10%, if his likelihood 
of getting sent to jail (such that he must wait to enjoy his spoils) increases from 25% to 50%, 
the expected value of his criminal gains drops from $77.31 to $54.62, a 29% reduction. If 
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suggests an implication similar to that arising from the forfeiture concern. If 
discounting is driving CAP-consistent findings, the likelihood-/severity-elasticity 
differential should not arise for crimes where the gain is enjoyed immediately such 
as assault or destruction of property. While this poses a problem with respect to 
distinguishing the forfeiture hypothesis and the discounting hypothesis, the 
discounting hypothesis only applies when the punishment involves a delay in 
consumption (i.e., when jail time is part of the punishment), whereas the forfeiture 
effect occurs independently of any jail time served. 
D. Judgment-Proof Criminals 
Using individual-level data, it may be possible to identify the extent to which the 
fact that a criminal may be judgment-proof102 drives any differential between the 
probability/severity elasticities. Namely, in the case of fines, individuals with more 
assets should exhibit less of a differential than individuals with fewer assets. For 
example, if an individual has $10,000 in assets, doubling a fine from $10,000 to 
$20,000 should have no effect, while increasing the probability of punishment from 
10% to 20% may have a large effect. For an individual with assets of $100,000, both 
increases may have large implications for the criminal’s evaluation of the 
attractiveness of the crime. For jail terms, the parallel issue involves the criminal’s 
age. Increasing a jail term from 20 to 40 years may make no difference for someone 
who is 60 years old, but it may have a large effect on a 20-year-old criminal. 
IV. POLICY RELEVANCE 
We have identified empirical approaches to disentangle the effects of 
stigmatization from criminals’ time preferences over sentences, and methods to 
distinguish between criminals’ risk preferences over monetary versus nonmonetary 
sanctions. Next, we discuss specific reasons as to why it is important to have such 
information, and how cost-effective and deterrent procedures can be designed by 
relying on such information. 
A. Optimal Law Enforcement 
There is a very broad law and economics literature on optimal law enforcement.103 
A brief examination of this literature suggests that criminals’ risk preferences play a 
central role in the determination of optimal law enforcement strategies. In particular, 
Polinsky and Shavell provide a brief and very informative survey of the existing 
literature on law enforcement where they point out the effects of risk attitudes on 
optimal law enforcement.104 They find it useful, as do we, to analyze separately the 
                                                                                                                 
 
instead, he faces a fixed 25% likelihood of arrest but his sentence doubles from 25 years to 50 
years, the expected value of his criminal gains drops from $77.31 to $75.21, a 3% decline. 
 102. See generally Shavell, supra note 85. 
 103. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67 (reviewing the existing literature).  
 104. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (reviewing how different risk attitudes affect 
criminals’ choices over different lotteries); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23 (providing an 
analysis of risk aversion); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 413–19 (giving an excellent 
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effects of criminals’ risk attitudes on effective law enforcement strategies for crimes 
punishable by imprisonment and for crimes that are not. 
When an offense is punishable only via monetary sanctions, “the risk aversion 
of individuals tends to lower the level of the optimal fine” under a general set of 
assumptions.105 This follows from two main reasons when one considers a situation 
where the likelihood of punishment is fixed106: “First, lowering the fine reduces 
the bearing of risk by individuals who commit the harmful act. Second, because 
risk-averse individuals are more easily deterred than risk-neutral individuals, the 
fine does not need to be as high to achieve any desired degree of deterrence.”107 A 
similar result is obtained when the probability and magnitude of sanctions are 
determined together:  
In effect, when individuals are risk averse, fines become a socially 
costly sanction (reflected in an increase in taxes) rather than a mere 
transfer of wealth. The more risk averse individuals are, the better it is to 
control their behavior by using a lower fine and a higher probability of 
detection, even though this raises enforcement costs.108 
As explained in Part II, individuals may have different risk attitudes over different 
domains. For crimes that are punished by imprisonment, the relevant risk concept is 
criminals’ risk attitude over imprisonment sentences. When criminals discount future 
punishments they appear to be risk seeking over sentences.109 The risk seekingness 
of criminals may reduce the optimal sentence. This follows because the deterrent 
effect of lengthy sentences is low, but the cost of imprisonment is substantial.110 
The ideas presented in this subpart summarize only a very small fraction of the 
observations made in the existing law and economics literature on optimal law 
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 105. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 420 (demonstrating that this conclusion 
holds regardless of whether there is a fixed or endogenous probability of detection in the law 
enforcement model). 
 106. There are a few reasons as to why enforcement costs might be fixed, or where it would 
be harmless to assume that they are. See generally Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General 
Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991) (demonstrating that the certainty of 
punishment for various crimes may be jointly determined through “general enforcement” 
efforts. A good example is a police officer patrolling a neighborhood. This investment in 
enforcement not only increases the probability of detecting theft but also the probability of 
detecting battery, murder, rape, etc.). 
 107. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 415. But see Louis Kaplow, The Optimal 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 3 (1992). As Polinsky and Shavell state, Kaplow demonstrates: “It is possible, 
however, that the optimal fine is higher in the risk-averse case than in the risk-neutral case, for 
the following reason. A way to reduce the bearing of risk is to deter more individuals from 
committing the harmful act, for then fewer individuals will be subject to the risk of the fine.” 
Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 67, at 415 n.22). 
 108. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 416. 
 109. See supra Part II.A. 
 110. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20 (discussing in greater detail the effect of 
lengthy sentences). 
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enforcement. Yet they demonstrate the central role risk preferences play in the 
determination of optimal law enforcement strategies, and the importance of 
disentangling the effects of time preferences from criminals’ risk attitudes over 
monetary outcomes.  
B. Optimal Plea-Bargaining Procedures 
It is often stated that over 90% of convictions in criminal cases in the United 
States are obtained through plea bargains.111 This statistic alone should demonstrate 
the importance of plea-bargaining procedures and also explain why plea bargaining 
has received much attention from academics.  
The existing law and economics literature has identified multiple reasons as to 
how plea-bargaining procedures can be designed to further social goals.112 Reduction 
in case loads and litigation costs appears to be the most preferred explanation as to 
why criminal justice systems should make use of plea bargains.113 Another potential 
and important gain from using plea bargains is that they can be used to screen out 
guilty defendants from innocent defendants in a cost-effective way.114 There are, of 
course, many critiques of plea bargaining, some related to an increased role for tactics 
and a reduced role for actual or demonstrable culpability in the conviction and/or the 
punishment of suspects in criminal trials.115 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. E.g., Gazal-Ayal & Tor, supra note 4, at 341; Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, 
Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 749 (1983); Avishalom Tor, 
Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain 
Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 99 n.5 (2010) (noting the approximately 95% guilty 
plea rate in small Texas counties in 2001). 
 112. See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Reducing False Guilty Pleas and 
Wrongful Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law 
& Econ., Research Paper No. 14-34, 2015), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490518 [https://perma.cc/8GEY-SCVQ]; sources cited supra note 111. 
 113. For this and similar explanations, see, e.g., David Bjerk, On the Role of Plea 
Bargaining and the Distribution of Sentences in the Absence of Judicial System Frictions, 28 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2008); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: 
An Explanation for “Unfair” Plea Bargains, 23 RAND J. ECON. 507, 507 (1992); Gabriel 
Kahn & Chester Mirsky, Special Report: The Crime Debate, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 
(May-June 1997), http://prospect.org/article/special-report-crime-debate [https://perma.cc
/F574-V2TP].  
 114. See, e.g., Grossman & Katz, supra note 111, at 749–50 (“The legal system is 
fundamentally characterized by asymmetric information; the accused know whether they are 
guilty, while the prosecutor never can be certain about a given defendant’s guilt or innocence. 
In this environment, the plea bargain often can be chosen to serve as a self-selection 
mechanism. By doing so, it contributes simultaneously to the accuracy of the legal process (by 
inducing the guilty to identify themselves) and to ensuring that violators of the law are indeed 
punished.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) (“Plea 
bargaining makes a substantial part of an offender’s sentence depend, not upon what he did or 
his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of 
criminal proceedings. In contested cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a 
judicial determination of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the 
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Whether or under what conditions plea bargaining is a socially desirable legal 
practice is a question that we do not aim to answer in this Article, as an attempt at 
answering this question would warrant multiple articles. One thing is clear, however. 
The answer to this question depends in part on criminals’ risk attitudes. This is 
demonstrated in one of the relatively early works on plea bargaining by Grossman 
and Katz, where the authors, under many simplifying assumptions, “show that if 
either the defendant or society is risk averse, then the plea bargain is socially 
beneficial as an insurance device.”116 
Although formal economic models, such as that used by Grossman and Katz, 
abstract from many relevant issues, they demonstrate the marginal impact of 
criminals’ preferences on the desirability of using plea bargains. A recent article by 
David Bjerk takes this approach and demonstrates the implications of criminals 
discounting future sentences, and therefore being risk seeking over sentences. He 
states:  
[T]his can preclude the possibility of a mutually acceptable plea bargain 
even when prosecutors are risk-averse. However, when plea bargains can 
be struck, the plea bargain sentences will necessarily fall short of the 
expected sentence from going to trial, especially for those defendants 
with only moderate evidence against them. This can result in sentencing 
distributions that appear far more lenient than would be implied by the 
statutory sentence from conviction at trial and the relevant probabilities 
of conviction at trial.117 
As these articles demonstrate, the way criminals evaluate future sentences and, 
accordingly, their risk preferences over sentences must be taken into account when 
designing plea-bargaining procedures. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Part II, 
criminals may appear to be risk seeking over sentences due to a second reason, 
namely stigmatization costs of convictions.118 Incorporating this possibility in future 
research may reveal that repeat offenders, who presumably suffer less from 
stigmatization compared to first-time offenders,119 should be offered different plea 
bargains.  As such, having a better understanding of criminals’ risk attitudes and the 
factors contributing to their risk attitudes is important for designing plea-bargaining 
procedures that are socially desirable.  
                                                                                                                 
 
requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
practice also deprecates the value of human liberty and the purposes of the criminal sanction 
by treating these things as commodities to be traded for economic savings—savings that, when 
measured against common social expenditures, usually seem minor.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 116. Grossman & Katz, supra note 111, at 750. 
 117. Bjerk, supra note 113, at 2. 
 118. There is an expanding law and economics literature on stigmatization and how it 
affects optimal law enforcement strategies. See, e.g., Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The 
Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007); Rasmusen, supra note 78; Mungan, supra note 96; Murat 
C. Mungan, Stigma Dilution and Over-Criminalization (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, 
Law, Bus. & Econ. Paper No. 14-16, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534828 [https://perma.cc/E4QH-E6WT]. 
 119. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 96. 
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C. Punishment of Repeat Offenders 
Sentencing guidelines call for increased punishments for repeat offenders.120 One 
among many reasons as to why this practice may be justifiable on utilitarian grounds 
relates to the differential stigmatization effect of conviction on repeat offenders 
versus first-time offenders.121 
An intuitive assumption employed in the existing literature is that ex-convicts are 
less attractive employees in the labor market.122 This being the case, crime becomes 
a more attractive option for ex-convicts who are unable to find legal means of 
employment. As such, deterring recidivism requires relying on increased penalties 
for repeat offenders.123 
Increasing the punishment for recidivists is, however, socially costly.124 This is 
especially true for crimes punishable by imprisonment.125 Therefore, a trade-off 
emerges between achieving higher deterrence rates for recidivists and lowering costs 
of imprisonment.126 Hence, disentangling the effect of stigmatization on criminal 
behavior from the effects associated with criminals’ time preferences over sentences 
is important for designing optimal sentence enhancements for repeat offenders. 
D. Discretion in Sentencing 
One effect of giving judges broad discretion over sentencing is creating 
uncertainty by increasing the variation in sentences. The deterrent effect of such 
uncertainty, and therefore the deterrent effect of indeterminate sentencing, depends 
to a great extent on criminals’ risk attitudes and, in particular, criminals’ time 
preferences regarding imprisonment. 
If criminals discount future sentences, due to reasons discussed in Part II, one 
would expect the creation of such uncertainty to reduce deterrence. If, to the contrary, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2014). 
 121. Funk, supra note 83; Kaku Furuya, A Socio-Economic Model of Stigma and Related 
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 123. Funk, supra note 83, at 715. 
 124. See sources cited supra note 121. 
 125. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 67, at 409–11 (discussing and reviewing how 
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2016] IDENTIFYING CRIMINALS’ RISK PREFERENCES 819 
 
criminals are risk averse over sentences, then one would expect high variation over 
sentences to increase deterrence.  
Furthermore, because people may have different risk attitudes when the sanction 
is monetary versus nonmonetary, the desirability of giving decision makers 
discretion may depend on whether or not the offense or crime in question is 
punishable by imprisonment. If, as commonly stated in the literature, people behave 
in accordance with CAP when the sanction is imprisonment, but not when it is 
monetary, then it may be cost-effective to give decision makers discretion when, and 
only when, the sanction is nonmonetary.  
In sum, determining the deterrent effect of determinate punishment requires the 
identification of criminals’ responsiveness to the certainty and severity of 
punishment in different contexts; and most importantly, when the sanction is 
monetary versus nonmonetary. 
E. Standard of Proof 
One frequently discussed issue in the economics of law enforcement literature is 
the optimal standard of proof in criminal trials.127 Most of these studies focus on 
risk-neutral potential offenders who are affected by the standard of proof applicable 
in trials.128 The researcher is generally interested in identifying the standard of proof 
that optimally trades off wrongful convictions for false acquittals.129 In fact, the 
discussion is often related to the famous Blackstone ratio,130 which stems from his 
statement that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent 
suffer.”131 Most of these studies provide justifications for the use of high standards 
of proof due to a variety of reasons, including: preventing the chilling of socially 
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desirable behavior,132 reducing punishment costs,133 and minimizing public choice 
related concerns.134  
A question not frequently asked is whether the implications of previous research 
are equally valid when one considers offenders who have behavior consistent with 
CAP. In a recent article, Professor Fisher relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality, 
and argues that “[o]ne factor that justifies lowering the standard of proof to 
sub-maximal levels is risk-loving tendencies.”135 Fisher’s arguments are derived 
from numerical examples that assume that offenders are risk seeking.136 The 
assumption of risk-seeking attitudes, in turn, is based on the idea that criminals 
perceive diminishing marginal costs associated with time in prison. 137  
As we have discussed earlier, there are many reasons to be cautious about making 
broad statements regarding risk preferences of individuals. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether the effects identified by Fisher are sufficient to weaken the justifications 
offered in the previous literature for maintaining high standards of proof in criminal 
trials. Nevertheless, Fisher’s study, at a minimum, demonstrates that relaxing the 
assumption of risk neutrality has important consequences regarding the way we think 
about the optimal standard of proof in criminal trials, and potentially other 
pro-defendant rules in criminal procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminals’ risk attitudes significantly impact the Beckerian analysis of many 
punishment policies. A true understanding of such attitudes would provide lucid 
policy implications concerning optimal law enforcement, plea bargaining, 
repeat-offender punishment, discretion in sentencing, and even standards of proof. A 
misunderstanding of criminal risk attitudes would lead to misinformed policies in 
these arenas. Furthermore, because most people are assumed to be risk averse, the 
conclusion that criminals are risk seekers is profoundly disturbing. For these reasons, 
it is imperative to acknowledge that CAP-consistent behavior does not necessarily 
imply risk-seeking attitudes. 
In the face of multiple theories that reconcile CAP and risk aversion, the question 
becomes one solvable solely through empirical scrutiny of these hypotheses. If 
stigma drives CAP-consistent behavior, then the elasticity differential between 
certainty and severity should be less observable in those who have been stigmatized 
than those who have not. If forfeiture of illegal gains drives this behavior, then the 
elasticity differential should be practically nonexistent for crimes where the criminal 
benefit is immediately enjoyed. A similar finding when imprisonment is involved 
could also support the theory that discounting causes CAP-consistent behavior. 
Additionally, a study that compares the elasticity differentials exhibited by 
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individuals of different wealth concerning fines could shed light on whether 
judgment proofness drives CAP-consistent behavior. 
While we have largely questioned the conclusion that criminals are risk seeking, 
we do not foreclose such a result. Rather, we recognize that any conclusion regarding 
criminal risk attitudes would have far-reaching theoretical implications and, thus, 
must be observed through precise empirical studies that account for these other 
hypotheses. 
  
